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Disclosure of Corporate Information 
to Trade Unions in North America 
Hem C. Jain 
The focus of this paper is on the information disclosed by 
companies in theprivate sector to trade unions in North America, 
with particular référence to Canada. 
In récent years governments and corporations hâve corne under great 
pressure to provide information about their activities. Well organized inter-
est groups in North America, such as consumers and trade unions hâve 
shown a great deal of interest in the concept of "disclosure of informa-
tion". Ralph Nader, the American consumer advocate, described informa-
tion as "the currency of democracy... the citizen's method of truly partici-
pating in the démocratie procédure". The United States Congress passed 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in 1976. The rationale of the act is 
that the public has the right to know the workings of its governmental 
bodies. The FOIA requires full disclosure of government agencies' docu-
ments unless specifically excluded by one of its nine statutory exemptions. 
In Canada, the minority Conservative government presented a similar bill in 
Parliament in 1979. 
As far as labour-management relations in Canada are concerned, the 
need to provide comprehensive information to the public at large in ail mat-
ters relating to industrial disputes has been recognized since 1918, when 
Mackenzie King wrote that ' 'the public has a right to be informed impartial-
ly on the merits of situations which threaten its well being." Mackenzie 
King laid a great deal of emphasis on compulsory investigation of ail mat-
ters related to disputes, including profits, priées, costs, compétition, com-
parative wages, and other terms and conditions of employment. He advo-
cated that ail findings be published in the Labour Gazette. He believed that 
"for public opinion to be effective, it is necessary that it be made informed 
opinion"1. 
* JA1N, Hem C , Professor of Management, the University of New Brusnwick, 
Fredericton, N.B. 
** Financial support for this study was provided by the Canada Department of Labour 
and the University of New Brunswick. 
î MACKENZIE KING, W.L., Industry and Humanity, Cambridge, Houghton 
Mifflin, the University Press, 1918, p. 518. 
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In the late 1970's a number of unions and staff associations made both 
formai and informai représentations to the Canada Department of Labour 
concerning the inadéquate state of corporate disclosure2. Some union 
leaders complain that in most bargaining situations they "don't know what 
the real financial status of the employer is, nor do they know which (if any) 
of the conflicting figures published on profits and productivity are ac-
curate"3. The following statement issued by the Canadian Labour Congress 
(CLC) is indicative of the importance the Canadian labour movement at-
taches to the disclosure of corporate information: 
"If trade unions are to successfully challenge corporate power; if trade unions 
are to add to their power, influence and knowledge; if trade unions are to promote 
social and économie planning; if trade unions are to protect their members through 
collective bargaining; and if corporations are ever to be held accountable for their 
actions; greater disclosure of corporate financing, investment, pricing policies and 
production-planning are absolutety essential."4 
Purpose of the Study 
There is very little material published on the information disclosed by 
companies in North America to trade unions. This paper is an attempt to fill 
this vacuum. The focus is on the information disclosed by companies in the 
private sector to trade unions in North America, with particular référence to 
Canada. To be more spécifie, this paper sets out to examine the following: 
1. Législation and corporate practices pertaining to the disclosure of in-
formation. 
2. Arguments for and against disclosure. 
3. Problems of practical application: lessons from the European expéri-
ence. 
4. Need for a company policy on the disclosure of information. 
5. Possible government initiatives. 
This paper is based on a review of the académie literature, officiai publica-
tions of unions, professional associations and employers' organizations, 
government reports and documents, and a survey of selected unions and 
employers' organizations in Canada. 
2 WOHLFARTH, Tony, "Corporate Disclosure and the Interest of Trade Unions" (a 
typewritten draft prepared for the Canada Department of Labour, Aug. 16, 1978), p. 1. 
3 FINN, Ed, "Freedom of Information: Justice for Workers", Civil Service Review, 
Spring/Summer, 1977, p. 3. 
4 "Corporate Disclosure", Canada Labour, June 1978, p. 35. 
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Reasons for Récent Interest 
The récent interest in additional disclosure of corporate information 
reflects the trade unions' growing anxiety over the pronounced trend 
toward corporate mergers, and the concentration of économie power in the 
hands of multinational companies. Trade unions hâve become painfully 
aware that over a period of time "a multinational may be able to alter the 
pattern of its international opérations by building up some subsidiaries 
faster than others — a prospect that may be used to great effect at the bar-
gaining table. For example, the Massey-Ferguson Company employed this 
tactic in 1968, when it threatened to concentrate its future expansion over-
seas if Canadian workers continued to pursue demands for equal pay with 
this U.S. counterparts."5 This anxiety is accompanied by a feeling that the 
Canadian government has failed to make large corporations accountable 
for décisions which might hâve an adverse effect on employment and the 
Canadian economy as a whole. Trade unions believe that "the answer to the 
large corporations is not to break them up but to make them accountable 
for their private décisions to a wider public than just the shareholders and 
other investors."6 
Another major reason for the increased interest in disclosure of infor-
mation has been past expérience with layoffs and redundancies. Technolo-
gical changes, automation, shifting of production from one plant to an-
other the take advantage of government subsidies or closeness to markets, 
as well as ownership transfer of companies, are ail important contributory 
factors to the rising rate of redundancies and layoffs. Trade unions would 
like to receive systematic information on ail thèse issues and would like to 
know the reasons behind any layoffs or réduction in the work force. They 
wish to be notified in advance of any contemplated changes in the labour 
force so that they can hâve an opportunity to influence management déci-
sions concerning layoffs or réduction of the work force7. 
Another reason for the interest in the corporate disclosure of informa-
tion is the enactment of a considérable volume of législation in Western 
5 DAVIES, Robert, "Industrial Relations and the Multinational Corporation: An In-
ternational Perspective", Labour Gazette, Nov. 1976, p. 577. 
6 "Corporate Disclosure", op. cit. 
7 Most European countries require that a company contemplating layoffs justify the 
réduction in the work force as well as give adéquate advance notice to trade unions and work-
ers' représentatives through such bodies as works councils, thereby enabling them to enter into 
discussions with management and governments on the various issues involved and to find ap-
propriate solutions in an attempt to mitigate the adverse effects on the work force. By contrast, 
workers in the U.S.A. enjoy very little protection of this kind uniess it is negotiated by their 
union. In Canada, the Carrothers Commission, appointed by the fédéral government to in-
quire into redundancies and layoffs, recommended in a report dated September 1979 that man-
agement be obliged by law to give advance notice to employées of proposed changes. 
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European countries. A comparison between the North American labour 
législation and that of Western European countries reveals that North 
America lags behind thèse countries with regard to corporate disclosure 
provisions8. In 1976, a significant development with regard to the provision 
of information to employée représentatives was the publication of a set of 
voluntary guidelines for multinational companies by the Organization for 
Economie Coopération and Development (OECD), of which Canada and 
the U.S.A. are both members9. 
Disclosure of Information Defined 
Information is perceived by both trade unions and management as a 
potential tool for enhancing their power vis-à-vis each other in an industrial 
relations System. This power dimension is given récognition by the Commis-
sion on Industrial Relations in the United Kingdom in thèse words: "The 
question at issue is not whether information should play a rôle in collective 
bargaining, but whether both sides should hâve equal access to it."10 To 
trade unions, "disclosure" means that employers hâve certain information 
which should be made available to them and that they should hâve the right 
to raise questions and demand explanations about the information and its 
implications. CLC has identified the following catégories of information 
which it considers as needed by trade unions: 
a) the firm's status; 
b) its competitiveness in the market; 
c) its production and productivity; 
d) the firm's financial structure; 
e) budget and cost accounting; 
f) staff costs; 
g) the firm's program and outlook for the future; 
h) scientific research; 
i) ail forms of public support received; 
j) the firm's organizational chart11. 
The Canadian Labour Congress seems to emphasize a checklist ap-
proach, i.e., items to be disclosed on a purely quantitative basis. However, 
8 See Hem C. JAIN, "Information, Training and Effective Participation", Industrial 
Relations Journal, Vol. IX, No. 1, Spring 1978. 
9 Organization for Economie Coopération and Development (OECD), "Déclaration of 
21st of June 1976 on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises", Bulletin of 
Comparative Labour Relations, Kluwer BV, Deventer, The Netherlands, VII, 1976, p. 353. 
io Government of the United Kingdom, Commission for Industrial Relations, Dis-
closure of Information, H.M.S.O., London, 1971, Para. 91. 
n "Corporate Disclosure", op. cit., p. 39. 
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research on the disclosure of information to trade unions in the United 
Kingdom indicates that "extension of the provision of information that 
does not take into account the use of that information will help neither the 
workers nor, in the long run, the company."12 
Company issued information is not just used by one individual union 
représentative but also by a number of union functionaries involved in the 
negotiation and administration of the collective agreement: labour manage-
ment consultative committees and participants in other forms of employée 
participation at plant and enterprise level. In order to perform their func-
tions well and to achieve their goals, trade unions and their représentatives 
need différent catégories, forms and présentation of company information. 
Furthermore, research on disclosure of company information in Western 
European countries13 suggests that trade union représentatives expérience 
difficulties in understanding, evaluating, and using company information. 
They also face problems with regard to the completeness and objectivity of 
company information; the form in which it is presented; and its lack of spe-
cificity, particularly concerning the organizational level to which it refers 
within the company (plant, branch, division, etc.). The frequency with 
which information is released and its lack of regularity and consistency can 
also be sources of problems for union leaders. Thèse problems will be ex-
plored in greater détail later in this paper. 
LEGISLATION AND CORPORATE PRACTICES PERTAINING TO 
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 
Législation and corporate practices pertaining to disclosure of infor-
mation in North America will be discussed under two broad headings: 
1. Financial disclosure to shareholders and availability of this information 
to trade unions under certain circumstances. 
2. Corporate disclosure directly to trade unions for collective bargaining 
and contract administration. 
Financial Disclosure to Shareholders 
U.S.A. 
It was not until 1900 that companies which listed their shares on the 
New York Stock Exchange were required to publish an annual report. In 
12 Ruskin Collège, Oxford, Trade Union Research Unit, "The Acquisition and Use of 
Company Information by Trade Unions", Final Report, SSRC, 1977, p. 10. 
13 JAIN, Hem C , op. cit. 
DlSCLOSURE OF CORPORATE INFORMATION TO TRADE UNIONS IN NORTH AMERICA 753 
1902, U.S. Steel was the first company to publish "the premier" modem 
annual report. The United States Congress enacted the Securities Act in 
1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act in 1934. Thèse acts gave regu-
latory authority over financial reporting to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). The SEC required that ail firms operating in the 
U.S.A. provide detailed information about their business and légal activi-
des annually on a 10-K form. Corporate management had an option to file 
the annual report in partial compliance with the financial disclosure require-
ments to be included in their 10-K forms. "Leading analysts consider the 
gap of information between the 10-K form reports and annual reports sig-
nificant.',14 
In 1976, the SEC set up an advisory committee on corporate disclosure. 
The committee was charged to define the purpose and objectives of the cor-
porate disclosure System, including an overall assessment of its effective-
ness, and to compare its costs to the resulting benefits15. In 1977, the advi-
sory committee, in its final report, recommended that "the Commission's 
function in the corporate disclosure system is to assure the public availabi-
lity in an efficient and reasonable manner on a timely basis of reliable, firm-
oriented information material to informed investment and corporate suf-
frage decision-making. The Commission should not adopt disclosure re-
quirements which hâve as their principal objective the régulation of corpo-
rate conduct."16 
Other recommendations of the advisory committee included: 
1. Developing disclosure guides for spécifie industries (such as railroads, 
gas and electric utilities, air lines, etc.) to encourage uniformity of dis-
closure by companies in the same industry. 
2. Developing a single integrated disclosure régulation with a "form CD" 
(coordinated) to cover ail SEC forms and reports. 
3. Making ail company reports and documents filed with the SEC availa-
ble to stockholders in addition to form 10-K. 
4. Encouraging the disclosure of corporate forecasts17. 
14 SINGHIVI, Surender S., "Corporate Management's Inclination to Disclose Financial 
Information", Financial Analysts Journal, July/August 1972, p. 67. 
15 See SEC release No. 33-55824 and also "SEC Commentary", in C.P.A. Journal, July 
1977, pp. 54-56. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
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In January 1980, the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed 
rules that would reduce the amount of information companies must file 
with the Commission but increase what they must tell shareholders. The 
new rules "would require companies to discuss in détail in their shareholder 
reports their financial conditions, touching on such matters as capital 
needs, liquidity and the impact of such économie trends as inflation."18 
CANADA 
The existing corporate disclosure législation in Canada is also primarily 
oriented to the capital market, i.e., a company is required to provide neces-
sary information to interested parties to enable them to make investment 
décisions. Such information is disclosed under a variety of corporation acts, 
securities législation, and combines laws. Législative authority for disclo-
sure is shared between the fédéral and provincial governments: "The pro-
vincial governments hâve the législative authority to incorporate, but in ad-
dition, hâve the constitutional power to compel disclosure from ail com-
panies wherever incorporated."19 
As far as the fédéral législation is concerned, the provisions for com-
pany disclosure fall under two main pièces of législation: 1. The Canada 
Business Corporations Act; 2. The Canada Corporations Act. The informa-
tion a company is required to disclose under thèse acts is similar to the pro-
vincial régulations. It is important to note, however, that présent capital 
market disclosure provisions do not apply to the privately held companies. 
In Canada, over one quarter of the 100 largest firms are privately owned 
and managed and are not subject to disclosure législation20. 
A report on corporate disclosure prepared for the Royal Commission 
on Corporate Concentration describes the state of Canadian disclosure 
législation as follows: 
"Viewed as a whole, Canadian corporate disclosure is fragmented and uneven 
in its application. Corporations must comply with the requirements of one or more 
of eleven jurisdictions and in each what, when and where to disclose may differ 
depending upon a combination of factors such as the place of incorporation, the 
place where business is carried on, whether shares are publicly traded, the company's 
size, the activities in which it is engaged and the entitlement to spécial exemptions 
granted by local courts and securities commissions... The jurisdictional mix of pro-
18 "S.E.C. Proposes Rules to Decrease Amount of Data Firms Must File with the Agen-
cy", The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 11, 1980, p. 2. 
19 "Corporate Disclosure", op. cit. 
20 W A H L F A R T H , Tony, op. cit., p . 4. 
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vincial securities acts, provincial companies acts and the fédéral companies acts give 
rise to an inefficient duplication of government functions, and despite genuine ef-
forts to promote uniformity, imposes multiple disclosure burdens on some firms 
while obscuring the public visibility of others that inhabit certain jurisdictional 
gaps."21 
Another act which applies both to corporation and trade unions is the 
Corporation and Labour Unions Returns Administration (CALURA). The 
disclosure implications of this act will be discussed later. 
Disclosure of Company Information Directly to Trade Unions For Collective 
Bargaining and Contract Administration 
U.S.A. 
Under the aegis of Section 8(a) (5) of the Labour-Management Rela-
tions Act, entitled "duty to bargain", the National Labour Relations Board 
and the courts in the U.S.A. hâve fashioned a doctrine and hâve established 
a body of administrative régulations requiring the parties interested to dis-
close information relevant to the bargaining process. The rationale for the 
duty to supply information draws from the good faith bargaining require-
ments of the law. 
Good faith in bargaining requires that the employer disclose to the 
représentatives of his employées, upon request, sufficient relevant informa-
tion to enable the représentative to bargain intelligently on issues which may 
be raised in negotiations of a new contract or the administration of an exist-
ing contract. Furthermore, both parties should engage in a process of offers 
and counter-offers. A failure to supply information is considered as a viola-
tion of the "good faith" requirement of collective bargaining, and violators 
are guilty of unfair labour practices under Section 8(a) (5) of the Labour-
Management Relations Act22. 
As far as the disclosure to unions of data on productivity, efficiency, 
production costs, accounting practices, and pricing policies is concerned, 
Irving Bluestone, Vice-Président of the U.A.W., has this to say: 
"Pertinent information concerning the opération, profits, schedules of produc-
tion are usually available to the union. The problem, however, is that much of this 
information, especially with regard to profits, production costs, accounting 
methods, pricing policies, etc. is required to be made available to the union only if 
21 KAZANJAN, J.A., "Corporate Disclosure", a background report for the Royal 
Commission on Corporate Concentration, Study No. 18, Ottawa, 1977, p. 51. 
22 U . S . Suprême Cour t , " N a t i o n a l Labour Relat ions Board Versus Trui t Manufac tur ing 
C o . " , Cornell Law Review, Vol. LVII I , Nov . 1972, p p . 23-50. 
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the company makes thèse matters part of the bargaining process by claiming a finan-
cial inability to meet the union's demands. Thus companies that are unprofitable and 
financially weak are often quick to disclose ail the pertinent information since it 
helps their cause. Financially strong companies, however, do not cry poverty or an 
inability to meet the union's demands and thereby escape the obligation to open their 
books."23 
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION 
Since the good faith bargaining requirement extends into the contract 
period, so the duty of an employer to provide sufficient relevant informa-
tion to the union's bargaining agents continues throughout the life of the 
collective agreement. The National Labour Relations Board (NLRB) has 
cited many instances of wage information requests which hâve a ''direct 
bearing" on the bargaining représentative's ability to administer the con-
tract and are thus considered presumptively relevant. Among the types of 
wage information having such a "direct bearing" on bargaining are 1) indi-
vidual earnings 2) job rates and classifications 3) merit increases 4) pension 
data 5) incentive earnings 6) pièce rates and 7) the opération of an incentive 
system24. In short, in the U.S.A., there exists a body of detailed administra-
tive régulations which specify the employer's obligation to furnish sufficient 
relevant data to unions for the purpose of collective bargaining and contract 
administration. 
CANADA 
In Canada, the information required under the existing labour codes 
(fédéral and provincial) pertains to issues such as certification and appro-
priate bargaining units. As far as collective bargaining is concerned, section 
66 of the Canada Labour Code states that "every employer shall furnish 
such information relating to the wages of his employées, their hours of 
work, and the gênerai holidays, annual vacations, and conditions of work 
of his employées, and make such returns thereon from time to time as the 
Minister may require." 
Labour laws in différent Canadian jurisdictions require employers and 
unions to bargain in good faith, but précise définitions of either "good" or 
"bad faith" bargaining are missing from the labour législation. Most 
23 BLUESTONE, Irving, a speech at the International Seminar on Workers' Participa-
tion, Belgrade, 2-11 Dec. 1969, extracted from International Labour Organization (ILO), 
"Report on the Seminar", mimeographed, Geneva, 1969, p. 153. 
24 B A R T O S I C , Florian and Roger C. H A R T L E Y , " T h e Employer ' s Duty to Supply In-
formation to the U n i o n " , Cornell Law Review, Vol. 58, Nov. 1972, p . 28. 
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labour relations boards hâve been unable to define the exact meaning of 
"good faith". Furthermore, Canada has not gone as far as the U.S.A. in 
drawing the implications of good faith bargaining. For example, in a novel 
extention of the good faith bargaining test, the U.S. NLRB held in a récent 
case that an employer who offered a meagre, virtually negligible wage in-
crease did so to induce employées to conclude that the union was of no use 
to them. ".. .No Canadian tribunal has yet had the temerity to test the good 
faith conduct of an employer by quantifying the wage offer."25 
While the information provided to stockholders is available and could 
be useful to trade unions, it is not always the type of information that trade 
unions need. For example, the financial information submitted under the 
Corporations and Labour Unions Returns Administration (CALURA) is 
Consolidated26 before it is released to the public. It is therefore of limited 
value to unions. Banks, insurance companies, and regulated industries such 
as communications and transportation are exempt from filing returns. 
Thèse corporations ail file returns under other statutes which are confiden-
tial and therefore not available to the public27. 
Unions' Evaluation of Disclosure Législation 
Canadian labour leaders hâve identified the following major gaps in 
the corporate disclosure field: 
1. The présent législation on corporate disclosure does not cover private 
companies. 
2. Even in the case of public corporations "information required under a 
prospectus does not contain information of a non-financial nature that 
would injure the corporation^ ability to raise capital, e.g., minority 
hiring practices, low wages, hazardous products, pollution, plant 
closures, etc. 
3. "Financial disclosure alone, by its very nature, looks at past perfor-
mance, not at future intent — and it is future corporate planning and 
decision-making which impacts so severely on trade unions and their 
members... It is necessary to hâve a regular and continuous flow of cor-
porate information to trade unions and the broader community. , , 
4. Canada has fallen behind the U.S.A. in the area of pension plan dis-
closure28. 
25 A R M S T R O N G , T .E . , " T h e Duty to Bargain in Good Fai th: Définition and 
R e m e d y " , Canadian Business Review, Conférence Board of Canada , Ot tawa, Vol. I I I , Sum-
mer 1976, p p . 35-37. 
26 " C o r p o r a t e Disc losure" , op. cit., p . 38. 
27 Ibid. 
28 " C o r p o r a t e Disc losure" , op. cit., p p . 38-39. 
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In a table prepared by Mr. Tony Wohlfarth for the Canada Depart-
ment of Labour a comparison is made of the existing corporate disclosure 
provisions in Canada with an itemized list of disclosure recommendations 
contained in a Canadian Labour Congress policy paper on this subject. Ex-
isting législation, together with an évaluation of the degree to which it con-
forms to the CLC's demands, is cited. Limitations to the coverage, timing, 
etc., are also noted. The findings from the table in the appendix are sum-
marized as follows: 
"Much of the information identified by the CLC is available on the Form 10-K, 
filed annually with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This report 
covers ail companies whose shares trade on U.S. stock markets, includïng some of 
the larger Canadian companies. As a conséquence, the available data is much more 
comprehensive for Canadian firms with U.S. interests. 
— Information not available in any form includes: 
a) information on a company's contracts with government, Crown Corpora-
tions, and subsidies received from thèse groups; b) output, productivity, utilization 
of productive capacity, value-added, statistics for (unorganized) office staff; also 
costing of social security and other fringe benefits. 
— Information available in insufficient depth: 
a) information on firm's future outlook e.g., long-term financing, plans for ex-
pansion; b) identification of competitors, and further disclosure on compétitive 
practices; c) detailed management accounting information; d) in-depth organiza-
tional information, particularly for subsidiaries of foreign parents."29 
In conclusion, the existing corporate disclosure information covers 
neither private corporations nor companies below a certain asset or revenue 
size. Generally speaking the information that is available is not of sufficient 
depth; it examines the past performance of a company but does not look at 
its future plans; therefore the information disclosed does not meet with the 
CLC requirements. 
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST DISCLOSURE 
Arguments for Disclosure 
In récent years the free enterprise System has corne under attack. This is 
partly due to a lack of accurate and adéquate information on how the Sys-
tem actually opérâtes. A policy of meaningful disclosure can illustrate the 
complexity of managements task, its gênerai fairness in allocating scarce 
resources, and the rôle enterprises play in creating wealth for the whole 
29 WOHLFARTH, Tony, op. cit., pp. 16-17. 
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society30. According to the président of the Bank of America, "Unified 
commitment to greater disclosure will do more for corporate réputations 
than ail the public interest advertising and public relations campaigns we 
could mount."31 
Some employers believe that voluntary disclosure of company informa-
tion to trade unions will yield positive benefits and that the provision of 
more information will promote a greater understanding of company pro-
blems such as the need for, and acceptance of, technological changes. Fur-
thermore, it will help in clarifying bargaining objectives. 
The disclosure of company information is also related to "Quality of 
Working Life" experiments, which, in North America, hâve been under-
taken mostly at the initiative of management. In the last décade, a number 
of "Quality of Working Life" centres hâve sprung up ail over North 
America. The objective of thèse centres is to contribute to the improvement 
of the quality of life at the work place by giving employées more involve-
ment in, and responsibility for, their work environment. 
Many union leaders in North America remain suspicious of the "Qua-
lity of Working Life" experiments and believe that thèse projects are mani-
pulative management schemes set up to increase output without regard to 
the interest of employées. Others feel that if they are to participate with 
management on equal terms in thèse experiments, they need accurate, op-
portune, and complète information which will allow them to form an inde-
pendent judgment on the merits of managements proposais, policies and 
décisions. 
The Canadian trade union movement strongly favours greater dis-
closure of corporate information. The Canadian Labour Congress, in a 
policy statement on corporate disclosure, has argued that if national and 
multinational corporations are to be held accountable for their actions, dis-
closure of corporate financing, investments, pricing policies, and produc-
tion planning are absolutely essential32. Trade unions also believe that 
greater disclosure of financial and non-financial corporate information is 
necessary for rational collective bargaining. 
In the final analysis disclosure of information is perceived by both em-
ployers and trade unions as a potential tool for increasing their bargaining 
power. Consequently, when employers and unions argue for greater dis-
30 S M I T H , Robin , " M a n a g e m e n t Exper t s ' Meeting of Informat ion and Communica -
tions in the F i r m " , O E C D background paper , Par is , O E C D , July 1974, p . 14. 
31 C L A U S E N , A . W . , " V o l u n t a r y Disclosure, Someone H a s to J u m p into Icy Waters 
F i r s t " , excerpts from a speech delivered in San Francisco, J a n . 1, 1976. 
32 " C o r p o r a t e Disc losure" , op. cit., p . 35. 
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closure, they often do so for différent reasons. For example, proponents of 
disclosure from the employers' side tend to believe that it will lead to ra-
tional and objective bargaining. They claim that it will influence the behav-
iour of trade unionists and is likely to resuit in moderating some of their 
demands and attitudes. On the other hand, unions may support disclosure 
in the belief that it will redress the power imbalance and will enable them to 
bargain as "equal" partners. Furthermore, it will assist them in mapping 
out their strategy on issues, such as when management can least afford a 
strike, and it will force management to justify its décisions33. Some aca-
démies, such as John Crispo of the University of Toronto, support union 
demands for greater disclosure: 
"Broadened information rights tend, in and for themselves, to foster a widened 
scope of bargaining. This link is likely to follow just as logically in North America as 
in Western Europe. Past North American notions about confidentiality of informa-
tion and exclusivity of employer residual rights are bound to prove increasingly passé 
in any and ail areas where vital employée interests pertaining to their income, securi-
ty and working conditions are involved."34 
Arguments Against Disclosure 
Other académies point out that financial data or économie variables 
can sometimes play, or seem to play, no rôle in some bargaining relation-
ships. For example, in the U.S.A., between 1945 and 1962, labour agree-
ments between employers and the West Coast Seafarers and Longshore-
men's Union contained the best package (including highest wage and fringe 
benefits) obtained by unions on the West Coast, despite a sharp industry 
employment décline, severe compétitive problems, and low profits35. Others 
hâve argued that in some industries, a company's financial and économie 
position has little relevance to the final negotiated settlement because the 
company usually follows the pattern of settlements established earlier by 
other union agreements. 
Some lawyers and consultants assume that disclosure of économie and 
financial information will give unions too much bargaining power and is 
likely to resuit in costly pay and benefit packages for the employer36. Even 
some unions are concerned that the acquisition and use of company infor-
mation may lead to union intégration in the managerial control System. 
33 JAIN, Hem C , op. cit., p. 52. 
34 CRISPO, John, Industhal Democracy in Western Europe: A North American Per-
spective, McGraw Hill, Ryerson Ltd., 1978, p. 152. 
35 LEVINE, Harold M., Determining Forces in Collective Bargaining, New York, John 
Wiley and Sons Inc., 1966, p. 26. 
36 HILL, John W., "Facts for Collective Bargaining", The Controller, June 1958, p. 
275. 
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Employers believe that most union negotiators lack expertise and train-
ing in financial accounting and économie matters. They argue that unless 
union delegates are in a position to fully understand ail the implications of 
the data provided to them, it could resuit in misinterpretation and mistrust, 
which in the final analysis could damage the bargaining process itself. Many 
employers genuinely fear that the leakage of confidential financial and éco-
nomie information in sensitive areas such as cost structure, pricing policies, 
and future plans would endanger not only the company's compétitive posi-
tion, but also its very survival. 
The final argument put forward against disclosure is that it encroaches 
upon and restricts managements right to manage. 
PROBLEMS OF PRACTICAL APPLICATION 
From the above discussion, one can clearly see that trade unions and 
employers hâve differing expectations of the need for, and the conséquences 
of, greater disclosure, The concept of disclosure of company information 
rests on a number of assumptions. Consequently, problems may arise when 
a System of disclosure is implemented. In order to gain insight into thèse 
problems, it is important to examine the following aspects of information: 
1. Behaviour of interested parties 
2. Confidentiality of information 
3. Préparation, présentation, and administration of information 
4. Information users' training and éducation. 
Most of the examples in this section are derived from this writer's study 
and observations of the extensive system of disclosure of information prac-
ticed in Western European countries. 
Behaviour of the Parties 
When discussing disclosure, people often assume that it is a rational, 
almost scientific concept of industrial relations, and that "facts" can bridge 
the gap between the goals and values of unions and those of management, 
two independent organizations with separate and partially incompatible 
goals. "Implicit in such a view is that information is accurate, objective and 
absolute. Not only can this be questioned, it is also unlikely that informa-
tion however accurate will always be accepted or given its due weight."37 
Because collective bargaining involves gamesmanship, trade unions are not 
37 MARSH, Arthur and Roger ROSWELL, "A Question of Disclosure", as quoted in 
Hem C. Jain, op. cit., p. 52. 
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likely to be constrained by the disclosure of facts, while discussing their 
demands, if they do not wish to be so. They would like to retain their free-
dom to manoeuvre and may accept or reject the "facts" as the situation 
warrants. 
Confidentiality of Information 
There is a legitimate and even essential need for corporate secrecy in 
some areas. At a U.S. Senate commerce committee hearing, four areas 
where confidentiality of information is necessary were identified. It is neces-
sary to protect incentives for innovation. Firms would be inclined to spend a 
great deal less time and money in developing new or improved products or 
better ways to produce old ones, if they knew that their competitors could 
hâve immédiate access to the new ideas or products developed. There is also 
a need to protect the vigour and candour of intraorganizational discussions 
about corporate décisions. Information in the possession of a company in-
cludes much that bears on the privacy of employées, customers, and stock-
holders. Files and records of this sort need protection from disclosure unless 
it is specified by law. Finally, there are certain classes of information that if 
disclosed would prevent the économie game from being played at ail. Com-
pétitive bidding, for example, could hardly work if each bidder knew the 
bidding plans of ail other bidders38. 
In Britain, Belgium, Holland, West Germany, and other European 
countries, there are légal provisions whereby employers are authorized to 
withhold certain information. The question as to what is confidential or 
where to draw the line is necessarily one which has to be answered and jus-
tified by management. 
While management may décide as to what is private or confidential, the 
criteria on which such a décision is based has to be negotiated with the trade 
unions and agreed upon by both parties. The obligation of workers' repré-
sentatives on joint decision-making bodies to keep the information secret 
créâtes a dilemma for the unions, i.e., "how can the rank and file employ-
ées participate in a meaningful way if the information given to a minority of 
them must be kept secret?"39 The disclosure also créâtes a dilemma for 
management. Condidential information supplied by management could be 
used by unions to enhance their influence and power and even to achieve 
their political ends. 
38 STEVENSON, Russell B. , J r . , " T h e Benefits of Disc losure" , excerpted from a state-
ment made at the hearings on Corporate Rights and Responsibilities of the U.S. Senate Com-
merce Committee, Washington D.C., June 1976. 
39 B L A N P A I N , Roger, "Provis ion of In fo rma t ion" , as quoted in Hem C. Jain, op. 
cit., p . 53. 
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Préparation, Présentation and Administration of Information 
Generally speaking, most companies with publicly owned shares pro-
vide their unions with a copy of their most récent annual reports. However, 
thèse reports are essentially historical documents which take a rétrospective 
rather than a current of forward looking view. Trade unions and their 
représentatives feel that they need information about the company's future 
plans and objectives so that they can make an appraisal of the factors asso-
ciated with corporate stratégie development. Furthermore, company 
reports are prepared primarily for shareholders. Trade unions need différ-
ent catégories, forms, and présentation of company information. The mère 
provision of corporate information which does not take into account the 
functional needs of its users, i.e., the unions and their représentatives, does 
not lead to its most effective use. Company information is used not just by 
one but by a number of union functionaries for différent purposes, such as 
collective bargaining, grievance processes, union-management committees, 
etc. In the future, such functions are likely to increase, and union function-
aries will be asked to perform a greater rôle in areas such as work organiza-
tion, profit sharing plans, and occupational pensions. 
Not only the type of information disclosed, but also the timing of dis-
closure is critical. In many instances, information is given to workers when 
the décision has already been finalized. In matters involving changes and in-
novations affecting the majority of the work force in the enterprise, provi-
sion of information in the formative stage of decision-making can be help-
ful to employées and their représentatives. In the early stages, attitudes and 
opinions on both sides can be accommodating and proposais can be easily 
altered. Décisions arrived at in this manner can be implemented more easily. 
Union leaders also believe that the mandatory disclosure of almost ail 
management accounting data in some industries as required by government 
regulatory bodies of the fédéral government in the U.S.A., is another highly 
désirable approach to the disclosure of information. The airlines and truck-
ing industries and their respective relationships with the Civil Aeronautic 
Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission are the clearest example of 
this situation. In both cases, affected companies are required to file detailed 
quarterly accounting reports that give a broad picture of their opérations. 
Information Users' Training and Education 
Disclosure of company information will not be of much use in itself 
unless the workers and their représentatives hâve the ability to understand, 
evaluate, and use it. Therefore, any considération of the improvement of 
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the préparation, présentation, and administration of information has impli-
cations for training and éducation of the following groups: 
1. management personnel 
2. employée représentatives and union functionaries 
3. rank and file members of the unions. 
Education and training include not only the acquisition of économie and 
technical skills, but also the development of effective communications 
skills. 
TRAINING FOR MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL 
In an organization, individuals occupying key positions in the commu-
nications System do not always hâve innate communications skills. They 
need to develop thèse skills, particularly in areas where they are not always 
highly trained, such as financial accounting. Training for management per-
sonnel at ail levels is primarily the responsibility of management. 
EDUCATION FOR EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES AND UNION STAFF 
In récent years, the question of access to information and training for 
the interprétation and use of such information, has assumed a great deal of 
importance for trade union officiais who are involved in collective bargain-
ing. For example, in Britain and Italy, the subject matter of collective bar-
gaining has extended from the traditional concerns with wages and working 
conditions, etc., to the rôle of workers and their représentatives at the work 
place and to other areas. In récent years, British unions, in view of their op-
position to plant closures, hâve asked the employer not only for financial 
information, but also for a "social cost-benefit analysis" in the handling of 
such situations. 
Unions are realizing that, in order to cope with such complex situa-
tions, workers and their représentatives need multidisciplinary éducation. 
An outstanding récent example has been the British Broadcasting Corpora-
tion séries on "Productivity Bargaining", a form of collective bargaining in 
which pay increases are related to changes in the use of resources and labour 
practices designed to increase productivity. At the suggestion of the Trade 
Union Congress, the séries was directed at the shop stewards and the rôle 
they played in handling productivity bargaining sessions. 
The British Trade Union Congress is also concerned with the introduc-
tion of new methods of computer controlled production planning Systems 
and data processing which offer prospects of increased productivity. It 
argues that such new methods of production be developed with the prior 
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agreement of both unions and management and that training courses be set 
up for the Systems* shop stewards40. 
The primary responsibility for the training of employées' représenta-
tives lies with trade unions. Many trade unions do undertake some training 
of their officiais. However, there are financial constraints which limit the 
trade unions' capacity to meet educational demands. 
TRAINING FOR RANK AND FILE 
It has been suggested that the rank and file's lack of knowledge and 
understanding of basic économie concepts might be a factor "retarding the 
more complète organization of workers into trade unions". The lack of 
économie éducation among organized workers could lead to décisions being 
taken on emotional grounds, such as the refusai by the rank and file to rati-
fy collective agreements reached by their union leaders after a careful analy-
sis of the économie position of the company and the industry. 
One of the problems hère is the release of rank and file from work for 
training purposes. Access to paid educational leave could greatly facilitate 
the training and éducation of rank and file employées as well as that of their 
représentatives. In a study on "Paid Educational Leave in Europe: its Im-
plications for Canada", published in 197841, this writer argued that trade 
union éducation was likely to increase in importance when unions gained a 
greater foothold in major industries in the private sector and if and when 
Western European style of "Workers' Participation" became widespread 
and accepted throughout the industrial world. Interestingly enough, most 
of the conclusions of my study on paid educational leave, which was sub-
mitted to the Canada Department of Labour in 1978, coincide with the 
recommendations of a report of the Canadian Commission of Inquiry into 
Educational Leave and Productivity released in June 197942. 
NEED FOR A COMPANY POLICY 
Before any organization can develop an information policy for em-
ployées and their représentatives, it needs to consider the objectives of dis-
40 " T h e Trade Union Rôle in Industrial Po l icy" , excerpts from Trade Union Congress, 
Report ofthe Conférence of Affiliated Unions, Oct. 31, 1977. 
41 JAIN, Hem C , "Paid Educational Leave in Europe: Its Implications for Canada", 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1978, pp. 499-500. 
42 Labour Canada , Commission of Inquiry on Educat ional Leave and Productivi ty, 
Report, Ot tawa, Queen 's Printer , June 1979, p p . 220-235. 
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closing information and the means to achieve thèse objectives,, In other 
words, it will hâve to do a cost-benefit analysis in the light of its own inter-
nai situation as well as the pressures from outside. The company may 
restrict itself to fulfilling minimum légal requirements or statutory guide-
lines, or it may adopt a policy of voluntary disclosure, and/or it may nego-
tiate an "information agreement" with trade unions. 
Voluntary Disclosure 
There are some companies which hâve voluntarily devised schemes for 
the provision of information to their employées in the belief that such 
schemes could lead to a better understanding of company aims and objec-
tives and thereby may increase employées' identification and commitment 
to its activities and objectives. 
In the U.S.A., a substantial majority of annual reports now include in-
formation on sales and earnings by product line and on effective income tax 
rates. "More than a third show foreign sales and earnings and losses. More 
than three quarters offer comparative financial data going back ten 
years."43 
In Canada, the Cyprus Anvil Mining Corporation distributed a twenty-
eight page report to its employées regarding such issues as the condition of 
the company's markets; new developments in exploration; outlooks for the 
future; breakdowns of the sales dollar into costs of salaries, wages, benefits, 
supplies services; and other items such as comparative charts of expenses 
and profits for a three year period. Another important feature is that the 
data put forward in a manner that can be easily understood by laymen44. 
The initiatives taken by some companies in the U.S.A. and by some 
Canadian organizations with regard to voluntary disclosure are indications 
that there is a degree of acceptance among employers in North America for 
the concept of disclosure of company information, but it will take some 
time before it gains wide acceptance and credence among ail interested par-
ties. Nevertheless, some unions see the annual report issued by the Cyprus 
Anvil Mining Corporation to its employées as a technique to influence 
labour negotiations in collective bargaining. The "employée reports" also 
hâve inhérent limitations. Such reports are issued annually and comprise in-
formation selectively presented by management. They are essentially one-
way communications exercises, that provide récipients with neither an op-
portunity to question nor to answer back. 
43 CLAUSEN, A.W., op. cit. 
44 " C o m p a n y Reports for Employées" , Financial Times of Canada, M a r d i 20-21, 1978. 
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The most direct and immédiate route for communicating relevant in-
formation effectively would appear to be the adaptation of a company's ex-
isting information/accounting System, which is designed to serve manage-
ments internai needs. Because the relevant information is already collected 
and prepared for managements use, its reliability (due in part to its regu-
larity and consistency) is greatly enhanced in employées* eyes and such in-
formation can be communicated to unions and their functionaries at little 
or no cost. 
Information Agreements 
It is in the interest of both employers and trade unions to negotiate an 
information agreement which will systematize the information requesting 
and disclosure process. Thèse agreements should be designed and operated 
at the bargaining unit level. As the company adopts a gênerai information 
policy, the individual information agreement will become an élément in the 
company-wide framework. In the United Kingdom, both the Confédération 
of British Industries and the Trade Union Congress hâve such agreements. 
The information agreement, to be effective operationally, needs to take 
into account the foliowing points. According to the Advisory Conciliation 
and Arbitration Servide (ACAS) of the United Kingdom, this agreement 
should incorporate the following: 
1. Spécifie itemized list of information to be disclosed 
2. Period of advance notice by trade unions for requests of relevant infor-
mation for collective bargaining purposes 
3. The level or levels (department, plant, division or company) at which 
disclosure may be requested and information obtained. Names and/or 
titles of trade union représentatives authorized to request information 
and company officiais to whom request should be made 
4. Speed with which the company should provide information and the 
procédure for keeping the fast changing information up to date without 
being asked 
5. Frequency and methods of disclosure; the form and style in which in-
formation is to be presented 
6. Types of information a company does not hâve to disclose on grounds 
of confidentiality 
7. The procédure for handling disputes arising over the interprétation of 
the clauses in the information agreement. 
768 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 36. NO 4 (1981) 
The last two points hâve aroused a great deal of controversy. However, 
this writer believes that despite the problems which attend disclosure of cer-
tain types of information, a joint agreement can be reached between a Com-
pany and trade unions on confidentiality of information. For example, in 
return for a management undertaking to release certain types of informa-
tion in confidence to selected union officiais, the union might agrée to 
restrict wider dissémination so that it may not fall into the hands of compe-
titors. 
Although a joint agreement may be reached between a company and 
trade unions on precisely what is to be disclosed, occasionally there will be 
disagreements about the interprétation of clauses on disclosure. Therefore, 
appeal mechanisms and arbitration procédures hâve to be considered. Once 
the parties hâve succeeded in concluding an information agreement, dis-
putes arising over the interprétation and administration of such an agree-
ment could be entrusted to the government conciliation and arbitration 
machinery for final resolution. We must note, however, that in the absence 
of any spécifie législation or guidelines on disclosure, unions will expérience 
difficulties in negotiating information agreements because labour relations 
boards will not go beyond the narrow limits of the "good faith bairgaining" 
clause, howsoever defined. 
GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES 
Governments can take certain initiatives to increase the flow of corpo-
rate information to trade unions and their représentatives for industrial 
relations purposes. There are arguments both for an against the establish-
ment of minimum législative standards of corporate behaviour with regard 
to the disclosure of information. Expérience indicates that "in the long run, 
a law certainly créâtes a climate of management opinion more broadly sym-
pathetic to the principles of disclosure than is usually the case in countries 
where no law on the subject specifically exists."45 However, we also know 
that whatever measures are taken to compel the employer to conform to the 
law, there will always be récalcitrant employer s who will not conform to 
minimum standards of disclosure. Furthermore, European expérience in-
dicates that législation alone cannot ensure adéquate corporate information 
for industrial relations purposes46. However, in the opinion of this writer, 
governments can and should take initiatives in the field of législation, col-
lection and distribution of information, further research, and éducation 
and training. 
45 SMITH, Robin, op. cit., p. 13. 
46 JAIN, Hem C , "Information, Training...", op. cit., p. 50. 
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Législation 
In the Canadian context, the fédéral and provincial governments could 
introduce new législation under the aegis of labour codes, requiring the em-
ployer to provide certain information to trade unions and their représen-
tatives. Such législation could either be spécifie, i.e., an itemized checklist, 
as exemplified by the document prepared by the Canadian Labour Con-
gress, or it could be in the form of a guide similar to the British ACAS code 
of practice under the Employment Protection Act (1975). The latter flexible 
approach allows for an administrative tribunal, similar to labour relations 
boards, to rule on spécifie cases. 
The présent capital market disclosure législation could be amended to 
conform with the needs of trade unions and their représentatives. Options 
may include: 
1. Enlarging the non-confidential portions of CALURA, to make it more 
useful to outsiders, based on the SEC model in the U.S.A. 
2. Expanding the coverage of the Canada Business Corporations Act to 
private companies regardless of their size, and encouraging uniformity 
in parallel provincial législation47. Such information could be reported 
on a standard comprehensive form and should follow the government 
approved accounting practices and guidelines. 
Collection and Distribution of Information 
When trade unions demand greater disclosure of information, it is not 
quite clear whether they are aware of information that is already available 
because it is in the public domain. It has already been pointed out that some 
of the information identified by the Canadian Labour Congress in its policy 
paper on corporate disclosure is available for publicly held companies. 
What is needed then, is an educational campaign to make people aware of 
the information that is already available, and how they can get it. It is con-
ceivable that union functionaries do not hâve easy access to corporate infor-
mation because this information is available under various pièces of législa-
tion and is scattered in eleven jurisdictions. Thèse jurisdictions require vary-
ing degrees of corporate disclosure. It is in this context that the Collective 
Bargaining Information Centre (CBIC) of the Department of Labour could 
play an important rôle. It could pool ail information on corporations in one 
central place and then make it available to the interested parties for indus-
47 WOHLFARTH, Tony, op. cit., p. 8. 
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trial relations purposes. CBIC could be empowered to gather confidential 
corporate information from other government departments who at présent 
hold it. If necessary, CBIC could collect information from the corporations 
directly. It should be pointed out that this data bank should consist of 
publicly available, but not readily accessible, information. Interested par-
ties must show évidence that they need information for industrial relations 
purposes. 
It was pointed out earlier that company information is used by a num-
ber of union functionaries for différent purposes. Therefore, it is impera-
tive that unions and their représentatives hâve a clear idea of what informa-
tion they want, and why they need it. Unions should improve research 
capabilities as an act of good faith. They should develop cohérent policy ob-
jectives and priorities together with consciously adopted stratégies toward 
their achievement. They may need the assistance of experts and specialists, 
not only in critically evaluating company information, but also in gener-
ating their own independent supply of information. Similarly, employers 
must examine their rôle as it relates to their own unions' demands for 
greater disclosure of information. 
Need for Further Research, Training and Education 
The Fédéral government could sponsor a survey of important Cana-
dian companies in the public and private sector in order to ascertain the ex-
tent to which individual companies provide financial and non-financial in-
formation to their bargaining agents and other union functionaries. A 
parallel survey of important trade unions could be undertaken to find out 
what spécifie financial and non-financial information unions need for in-
dustrial relations purposes. Such surveys would help to raise the conscious-
ness of both the employers and trade unions on the issues concerning dis-
closure of information, and would help them to crystallize their thinking. 
As a follow up, educational workshops and seminars could be held in 
various parts of the country to provide a forum for enlightened employers 
who hâve voluntarily provided the necessary company information to their 
unions. Union and community leaders should also be invited to such work-
shops. The resulting publicity would help to mould public opinion and cre-
ate a positive attitude toward the disclosure of corporate information. Such 
educational seminars could also provide feedback useful to government in 
developing minimum législative standards and guidelines. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
There seems to be gênerai agreement among trade unionists that 
greater disclosure of company information will improve labour manage-
ment relations and in the long run will resuit in a more rational bargaining 
process. 
Expérience with the disclosure of company information in Belgium, 
France, Germany, and Britain indicates that the passage of législation in 
this regard is not enough. It needs to be complemented by a positive and 
meaningful information policy at the company level. It is important to in-
volve the unions and their représentatives from the very beginning and to 
seek their coopération throughout the process of establishing the informa-
tion policy and system. Problems concerning confidentiality; timing of in-
formation releases, i.e., its frequency, regularity and consistency; the form 
in which it is presented; etc., should be amicably negotiated between the em-
ployer and trade union représentatives. The chances of negotiated informa-
tion agreements are limited if trade unions and their représentatives harbour 
suspicions about the employers' basic attitudes toward disclosure. A com-
pany information policy is effective to the extent that it is perceived by em-
ployées and their représentatives as a product of their joint consultation and 
negotiations. Trade unions and their représentatives also hâve an obligation 
to develop a cohérent information policy as to what information they need 
and why they need it. They must equip union functionaries with necessary 
skills and abilities to enable them to evaluate and use the company infor-
mation. 
In the opinion of this writer, the three approaches: 1) voluntary dis-
closure 2) negotiated information agreements and 3) minimum légal re-
quirements or statutory guides for disclosure discussed above are not mu-
tually exclusive. Companies, unions, and governments, respectively, should 
explore thèse approaches. However, prior to the introduction of législation, 
it would be advisable for the government to start with the dissémination of 
the information which is already available; to sponsor surveys of companies 
in the private and public sectors and to conduct workshops to educate the 
public on the issues of disclosure of information. 
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La divulgation aux syndicats de renseignements 
sur l'activité des entreprises 
Des groupes de pression, comme les consommateurs et les syndicats, ont mani-
festé beaucoup d'intérêt pour tout ce qui touche à la divulgation de l'information en 
général. En matière de relations de travail, la nécessité d'informer le public est recon-
nue depuis fort longtemps. Mackenzie King en faisait état à la fin de la première 
guerre mondiale. À la fin de la décennie 1970, de nombreux syndicats ont fait des 
représentations aux gouvernements en ce sens. Ils se plaignaient qu'ils ne connais-
saient pas la situation financière des entreprises non plus qu'ils ne pouvaient être 
assurés de la véracité des statistiques publiées relativement aux profits et à la produc-
tivité. 
Le but de l'article, si l'on admet qu'il n'y a que très peu de renseignements four-
nis aux syndicats par les entreprises en Amérique du Nord, et encore moins au 
Canada, est de combler ce vide en étudiant la législation et les pratiques des entrepri-
ses relativement à la divulgation de l'information, en énonçant les arguments favora-
bles ou opposés à la divulgation, en exposant les problèmes que de telles mesures 
soulèvent, en faisant valoir la nécessité pour les entreprises d'avoir une politique en 
cette matière et en indiquant les initiatives possibles de la part des gouvernements. 
L'intérêt pour cette question ressort d'abord de la crainte ressentie par les syndi-
cats face à la tendance à la concentration des pouvoirs économiques des entreprises 
entre les mains des multinationales alors que le gouvernement a failli à la tâche 
d'obliger ces entreprises à répondre des décisions qui peuvent avoir un effet néfaste 
sur l'emploi et l'économie canadienne dans son ensemble. Il ressort aussi de l'expé-
rience passée en matière des mises à pied et de réduction de personnel. Aussi, les syn-
dicats souhaiteraient-ils avoir une information systématique au sujet des change-
ments projetés dans la main-d'oeuvre de manière à pouvoir influencer les décisions 
administratives. Les changements technologiques, l'automation, les déplacements de 
production d'une usine à l'autre, les transferts de propriétés sont autant de transfor-
mations qui peuvent avoir une influence profonde sur la vie personnelle des travail-
leurs. 
D'une façon générale, la divulgation de l'information est perçue tant par les 
syndicats que les employeurs, comme un outil destiné à renforcer leur pouvoir de 
négociation. Il ne s'agit pas tant de savoir si l'information devrait jouer un rôle dans 
la négociation collective que de vouloir pour toutes les parties un accès égal à l'infor-
mation. Pour les syndicats, la divulgation veut dire que les employeurs possèdent 
certains renseignements qu'ils ne connaissent pas et concernant lesquels ils vou-
draient obtenir des explications. Le Congrès du travail du Canada a identifié plu-
sieurs catégories de renseignements qu'il estime nécessaires aux syndicats comme le 
statut de l'entreprise, sa situation de concurrent sur les marchés, sa production et sa 
productivité, sa structure financière, son budget, ses profits pour l'avenir, son orga-
nigramme, etc., mais ce n'est pas tant l'abondance des données qui compte que les 
renseignements utiles à la négociation et à l'administration des conventions collec-
tives. 
Jusqu'ici, au Canada, la divulgation d'informations imposée aux entreprises a 
eu principalement pour objet de permettre aux actionnaires et au public de prendre 
des décisions sages dans le domaine des investissements, mais cette législation ne 
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s'applique pas aux compagnies privées qui forment tout de même le quart de toutes 
les entreprises importantes du pays. Aucune loi, par ailleurs, n'impose aux em-
ployeurs l'obligation de renseigner les syndicats, si ce n'est par le biais de l'obligation 
de négocier de bonne foi. Aux États-Unis, on a interprété la loi de façon que le refus 
d'informer les syndicats était considéré comme une violation de cet impératif législa-
tif, mais il s'ensuit que les entreprises, qui sont financièrement faibles, s'empressent 
d'ouvrir leurs livres et servent ainsi leurs causes, tandis que les compagnies financiè-
rement fortes ne crient pas à la pauvreté et elles échappent à l'obligation d'ouvrir 
leurs livres. 
Il en va autrement au Canada. Le Code canadien du travail stipule bien que tout 
employeur doit fournir au Ministre du travail les renseignements se rapportant aux 
salaires de ses employés, à leur horaire de travail, aux congés et aux vacances. D'au-
tre part, dans les législations des provinces, il est prescrit que les employeurs et les 
syndicats doivent négocier de bonne foi, mais, on a été jusqu'ici incapable de définir 
exactement le sens de ''bonne foi". Aucun tribunal canadien n'a encore eu la témé-
rité d'éprouver la conduite d'un employeur en quantifiant l'offre salariale. 
Même si l'information fournie aux actionnaires peut être utile aux syndicats, ce 
n'est pas toujours de ce genre de renseignements dont ils ont besoin. En règle géné-
rale, cette information n'est pas assez détaillée; elle fournit surtout des indications 
sur le passé de l'entreprise, mais elle ne contient que peu de choses touchant son 
développement et ses projets pour l'avenir. 
S'il y a, par ailleurs, des arguments favorables à une certaine diffusion de l'in-
formation aux syndicats, d'autres arguments militent au contraire. Et ceci s'applique 
tant aux employeurs qu'aux syndicats. À une époque où la libre entreprise est forte-
ment attaquée, il peut y avoir avantage pour les employeurs à la faire connaître 
mieux et plus profondément à leurs salariés et au public en général, de faire ressortir 
la complexité des tâches qu'il lui faut assumer ainsi que le rôle qu'elle joue dans la vie 
sociale. De plus, pour les employeurs, la divulgation de certains renseignements aux 
syndicats peut favoriser l'entente et la compréhension, clarifier les objectifs de la 
négociation. Elle permet encore d'exposer publiquement les projets relatifs à l'amé-
lioration de la qualité de la vie en milieu de travail. Quant aux dirigeants syndicaux, 
ils estiment qu'une diffusion plus complète de renseignements de nature financière 
ou autre est nécessaire à une négociation collective objective et rationnelle. En résu-
mé, les employeurs considèrent que la diffusion de l'information est de nature à in-
fluencer le comportement des salariés, à modérer leurs exigences. Pour leur part, les 
syndicats pensent qu'une meilleure information permettrait de redresser la balance 
du pouvoir en faisant des partenaires égaux. 
Toutefois, tout le monde est loin de partager ce point de vue optimiste. Pour 
certains spécialistes des relations professionnelles, les questions financières et écono-
miques n'ont que peu d'influence sur le déroulement des négociations. Tandis que 
pour d'autres, la diffusion de renseignements donnerait un pouvoir de négociation 
trop considérable aux syndicats. Nombre d'employeurs croient que les négociateurs 
syndicaux manquent de l'expérience et de l'entraînement nécessaires pour bien inter-
préter les questions de comptabilité et de finance. Ils craignent aussi que la divulga-
tion de renseignements d'ordre économique et financier mette en danger la position 
concurrentielle de l'entreprise et même son existence. 
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En résumé, on voit que les syndicats et les employeurs, même lorsqu'ils sont 
d'accord sur la nécessité de diffuser de l'information, recherchent des fins différen-
tes sinon opposées. C'est pourquoi il faut tenir à la fois compte du comportement 
des parties, du caractère confidentiel de certains faits ou de certaines données, du 
choix de l'information, de sa préparation, de sa présentation, de l'utilisation que 
l'on peut en faire, des personnes à qui elle doit être divulguée, des fins auxquelles elle 
peut servir. 
Comme certaines entreprises diffusent volontairement des renseignements à 
leurs employés et aux représentants syndicaux, il serait utile et intéressant de négocier 
des ententes à ce sujet. Ces accords pourraient porter sur les points suivants: la liste 
des renseignements à donner, le moment où ils devraient être fournis, le niveau de 
l'entreprise qui se chargerait de la diffusion, la fréquence de l'information, le type de 
renseignements qu'on garderait confidentiels, la mise en place d'un mécanisme qui 
permettrait de régler les différends en cette matière. 
De leur côté, les gouvernements devraient prendre certaines initiatives législa-
tives et rendre obligatoires des mesures qui obligeraient les employeurs à fournir aux 
syndicats et à leurs représentants certaines informations utiles dans la négociation 
collective. 
On peut conclure que, d'une façon générale, les syndicats favorisent une plus 
grande diffusion de l'information et que cela serait de nature à améliorer les relations 
professionnelles. Les employeurs se montrent beaucoup plus réticents. L'expérience 
des pays européens indique qu'il ne suffit pas d'adopter des lois cependant. Mieux 
vaut que la diffusion de l'information se fasse sur une base volontaire. Aux em-
ployeurs, il importe de rappeler qu'une politique de divulgation de l'information ne 
saurait être efficace que dans la mesure où elle est perçue par les employés et leurs 
représentants comme le résultat de la consultation entre les deux partenaires. Aux 
syndicats, il s'impose de prendre les moyens nécessaires pour évaluer objectivement 
les renseignements dont ils disposeront. 
Trois conditions sont nécessaires pour qu'une telle politique réussisse: la divul-
gation doit se faire sur une base volontaire; il faut que la diffusion des renseigne-
ments soit établie à la suite de négociations entre les parties; il importe d'adopter cer-
taines dispositions législatives qui mettent à la portée des syndicats les renseigne-
ments déjà disponibles. 
